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COMMENT
A POSTSCRIPT TO CALVERT CLIFFS'
NORMAN J. LANDAU*
Of the abundance of environmental legislation recently enacted,
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 1 (NEPA) continues
to be the subject of much of the important litigation in the area of
environmental protection.' In large measure, the current importance
of NEPA directly results from the effect that its provisions have had,
and will continue to have, on the activities and procedures of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The significance of the connec-
tion between NEPA and the AEC unquestionably arises from the
authority of the AEC to regulate the use of nuclear energy through
its licensing power. Not only is the Commission authorized to regulate
radiological pollution caused by the direct discharge of atomic wastes,
but perhaps more importantly, the Commission is at least indirectly
empowered to control the thermal pollution likely to result from the
anticipated increased use of nuclear energy by the electric power in-
dustry.8 Traditionally, the Commission has appeared4 either unwilling
* BA., Brooklyn College, 1951; LL.B., St. John's University, 1954; Member of the
New York Bar; Co-author, Landau and Rheingold, The Environmental Law Handbook
(1971); Member of the Board of Governors, American Trial Lawyers Association.
1 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. (1970).
2 One need only look at the broad coverage the Act receives in this Special Issue of
the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review in order to realize its sig-
nificance.
3 Thermal pollution results from the direct discharge of water used to cool atomic
reactors back into its original source. The water of a river or a bay is usually utilized to
cool the heated generators of the nuclear power plants; naturally, the water absorbs the
heat, causing a significant temperature increase. When the used water is discharged into
the body of water from which it was initially taken, the heat from the discharge is dif-
fused through the water source thereby raising its temperature, in many cases, substan-
tially.
As one might suspect, nuclear power plants are placed adjacent to these water sources
in order to insure an ample supply of cooling water. In many instances, the most conve-
nient location for the plant is next to an estuary area, which is normally sheltered by
land and fairly shallow. These areas constitute the most favorable environmental context in
which marine life may develop. For this context to exist, a delicate balance of atmospheric
conditions must be maintained. A crucial factor in this delicate balance is the water tem-
perature; any fluctuation of it can seriously disrupt, if not destroy, the context.
The discharge of heated water into the estuaries obviously affects the water source
temperature and can consequently disrupt the estuary's delicate environment. As part of
its responsibility in issuing licenses and permits, the AEC must take the necessary steps
to minimize damage to the estuary environment. Although NEPA's requirement of an
impact statement should alert the Commission to these dangers, the necessity for provid-
ing adequate amounts of electricity may counterbalance these precautions as the demand
for power increases. Consequently, the role of the Commission in controlling thermal pol-
lution will continue to be significant as additional power plants are constructed.
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or reluctant to act in order to prevent the type of environmental dam-
age which thermal pollution engenders. It is this reluctance which has
alarmed many environmentalists.'
Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reviewed the practices and procedures of the
Commission in the landmark decision of Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission.° In finding that the
procedures of the AEC failed to conform with the requirements of
NEPA,7 the court provided encouragement to citizens anxious for
change in the Commission's environmental posture. In essence, the
decision mandated that the procedural requirements of NEPA must
be complied with "to the fullest extent possible" by federal agencies
under the Act's jurisdiction.' More importantly, the court also found
that the Commission had not acted in good faith in fulfilling these re-
quirements, thereby suggesting that the courts do have authority, un-
der the Act,' to declare that an agency's procedures for determining
environmental impact are inadequate, even though they may conform
to the "letter" of the law. 1°
In the immediate aftermath of Calvert Cliffs', it seemed certain
that the newly declared necessity for procedural compliance with NEPA
would guarantee to the public adequate disclosure of the environmental
effects of all AEC decisions. This response was reinforced by both the
AEC's failure to appeal the decision and the attitude of the new Chair-
man of the Commission, Dr. James R. Schlesinger. Prior to Calvert
Cliffs', the Commission had been committed to a policy of promoting
nuclear energy and, consequently, the nuclear power industry. 11
 The
natural result of this policy was, of course, an intentional disregarding
of environmental hazards of nuclear projects as well as a less than
complete investigation of their potential dangers in order to lower in-
dustry costs. With the contemporaneous appointment of Chairman
For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Reis, Environmental Activism; Thermal
Pollution—AEC and State Jurisdictional Considerations, at p. 633 supra.
4
 See New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969), cart, denied, 395 U.S.
962 (1969). In this case, the court accepted the Commission's argument that AEC re-
sponsibility extended only to radiological pollution. The possibility of thermal pollution
resulting from a licensed nuclear power plant, the court decided, was not properly the
responsibility of the Commission. 406 F.2d at 176.
5 This was the concern of the petitioners in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee,
Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6 Id. For a detailed discussion of the court's holdings, see Casenote, at p. 802 infra.
7 449 F.2d at 1112.
8 Id. at 1114 and 1118.
o Id. at 1115.
to Id. at 1116.
II See Larson, Present State and Future Outlook of Nuclear Power Generation in the
United States, 12 Atomic Energy L.J. 274, 292-93 (1970); see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 21,
1971, at 1, col. 5.
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Schlesinger and the decision in Calvert Cliffs', the Commission pub-
licly announced a shift in policy away from solely promoting the in-
dustry and toward "serving the public interest." 12 Indeed, at this point,
it appeared to environmentalists that the Commission was finally mov-
ing in the right direction.
Since then, however, a number of events have dramatically af-
fected both the improved method's of disclosing nuclear energy haz-
ards, engendered by Calvert Cliffs', and NEPA itself. Although the
AEC promulgated new regulations governing its investigating proce-
dures subsequent to Calvert Clif s'—a matter that this comment will
consider further—a series of later court decisions regarding the nu-
clear test at Amchitka Island has clouded the meaning and impact of
NEPA, perhaps permanently impairing its effectiveness as regards
nucear pollution control.
I. THE NEW REGULATIONS
In September, 1971, the Commission responded to the order of
the Calvert Clif s' court by filing new procedures for investigating the
environmental impact of projects either requiring the approval of or
undertaken by the AEC.14 Specifically, the procedures were drafted
to conform to the stringent requirements of NEPA. In Calvert Cliffs',
the court had focused its review on the inadequacies of AEC proce-
dures in considering the environmental impact of projects and activi-
ties within AEC jurisdiction. Although the case was concerned solely
with the Commission's procedures regarding the necessity of raising
environmental information during a Commission hearing on a proposed
12
 Id. In the preface to its new regulations, the Commission stated that it "intends
to be responsive to the conservation and environmental concerns of the public." 36 Fed.
Reg. 18071 (Sept. 9, 1971).
13
 The improved method of disclosure actually consists of the "detailed statement"
requirements of NEPA and their rigorous judicial enforcement. The "detailed" or impact
statement is compiled by the agency which is carrying out, or has authority over, the
action or activity which may have an impact on the environment. The statute requires
that the detailed statement include information regarding:
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(b) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented;
(c) alternatives to the proposed action;
(d) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of Iong-term productivity; and
(e) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (i)-(v) (1970). Rigid enforcement of these requirements, it is ar-
gued, will increase the likelihood of disclosure of nuclear energy hazards. See discussion in
text at note 37 infra.
14 The new procedures are compiled in 36 Fed. Reg. 18071 (Sept. 9, 1971) and 36
Fed. Reg. 19158 (Sept. 30, 1971).
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project," the implications of the decision logically extend to other
procedures of the Commission as well as to those of other federal agen-
cies.
As prescribed by NEPA, the requirements imposed on AEC pro-
cedures are designed to insure the agency's accumulation and assess-
ment of environmental information with regard to the particular project
currently under agency consideration. Of the procedural requirements
mandated by the Act, the requirement that the agency must prepare
an impact statement has been construed by the courts" as the most
important in disclosing potential environmental danger. In light of
these decisions and the general mandate of Calvert Cliffs', the Com-
mission has moved to improve its procedures for gathering both in-
formation and opinions for inclusion in the impact statement."
Prior to Calvert Cliffs', AEC procedures permitted the Commis-
sion to defer to the findings of other agencies in regard to the prob-
able impact of a proposed project." Consequently, the AEC often
refrained from conducting its own investigation in areas which it be-
lieved were within the domain of other agencies. The new procedures,
15
 The court indicated that it was concerned with "specific parts" of the Commis-
sion's procedural rules. The court summarized the rules as follows:
(1) Although environmental factors must be considered by the agency's regulatory
staff under the rules, such factors need not be considered by the hearing board
conducting an independent review of staff recommendations unless affirmatively
raised by outside parties or staff members. (2) Another part of the procedural
rules prohibits any such party from raising non-radiological environmental issues
at any 'hearing if the notice for that hearing appeared in the Federal Register
before March 4, 1971. (3) Moreover, the hearing board is prohibited from con-
ducting an independent evaluation and balancing of certain environmental factors
if other responsible agencies have already certified that their own environmental
standards are satisfied by the proposed federal action. (4) Finally, the Commis-
sion's rules provide that when a construction permit for a facility has been issued
before NEPA compliance was required and when an operating license has yet to
be issued, the agency will not formally consider environmental factors or require
modifications in the proposed facility until the time of the issuance of the operat-
ing license. Each of these parts of the Commission's rules will be described at
greater length and evaluated under NEPA in the following sections of this opinion.
449 F.2d at 1116-17.
16
 A number of recent cases have emphasized the necessity for agency issuance of
adequate impact statements before agency action may be taken or approval of projects
granted. See, e.g., Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, Civil No. 1331, 3 E.R.C. 1458 (D.D.C.
Dec. 22, 1971) (holding that the Army Corps of Engineers must file impact statements
before issuance of discharge permits under the Refuse Act of 1899); New York City v.
United States, — F. Supp. —, 40 U.S.L.W. 2474 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1972) (ICC must file
impact statement before permitting abandonment of New York harbor railroad opera-
tions); Green County Planning Bd. v. FPC, — F.2d —, 40 U.S.L.W. 2521 (2d Cir. Jan.
17, 1972) (Federal Power Commission must issue detailed environmental impact state-
ment before its hearing examiners recommend initial approval of major power projects
affecting the environment).
17 The preface to the new regulations indicates that AEC changes will be made in
preparing impact statements. See 36 Fed. Reg. 18071 (Sept. 9, 1971).
18 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. D at 249 (1971).
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in contrast, recognize the Commission's responsibility to investigate
numerous environmental impacts, including those which may affect
thermal and other water quality standards." Moreover, the Commis-
sion will henceforth submit the relevant impact statement to those
federal agencies designated by the Council on Environmental Quality
as having "jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved.”" This procedure should help insure
that the impact statement will include essential information concern-
ing environmental impacts and, at the same time, it will assist the Com-
mission in assessing all environmental factors before reaching a deci-
sion.
In making its assessment, the Commission will now also consider
the suspension of certain construction permits and licenses, pending
NEPA environmental review.2' Prior to the Calvert Cliffs' decision,
the AEC had refused to reconsider projects which had been authorized
previous to the enactment of NEPA.' The new regulation makes all
the licenses and permits of projects authorized prior to NEPA's effec-
tive date vulnerable to suspension and review. 28 Furthermore, the new
rule also indicates that the Commission will interrupt the construction
of any nuclear facility at any time to reassess its environmental im-
pact and, if the review merits it, the Commission will order the adop-
tion of an alternative course of action for the facility 2a
This latter procedure, in particular, is indicative of the Com-
mission's policy shift in paying greater heed to the public interest.
Obviously, any Commission action that interrupts or forestalls the
construction of a nuclear facility will increase its financial cost. This
additional expense will, in large measure, be borne by the industry
over which the Commission had, until recently, extended protective
umbrage.
In spite of their positive tone, however, the new regulations pro-
vide at least one procedure which ignores the mandate of NEPA.
13
 The environmental report of the applicant, upon which the Commission will draft
its preliminary detailed statement,
shall include a discussion of the status of compliance of the facility with applicable
environmental quality standards and requirements ... which have been imposed
by Federal, State, and regional agencies having responsibility for environmental
protection. In addition, the environmental impact of the facility shall be fully dis-
cussed with respect to matters covered by such standards and requirements
irrespective of whether a certification from the appropriate authority has been
obtained. . . .
36 Fed. Reg. 18073 (Sept. 9, 1971) (emphasis added).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 18075. This regulation pertains to permits issued prior to January 1, 1970—
the effective date of NEPA.
22 449 F.2d at 1117.
23 36 Fed. Reg. 18075 (Sept. 9, 1971).
24 Id.
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Section D. 3 of the new regulations permits the operation of a nuclear
plant at twenty percent or more of its full operating power where the
Commission gives prior approval even though the AEC has not yet
completed its NEPA environmental review." Although the regulation
permits this operation only "in emergency situations or [in] situations
where the public interest so requires,"" the rule effectively permits op-
eration without the submission of an impact statement. Several orga-
nizations challenged the adequacy of this AEC regulation in Izaak
Walton League v. Schlesinger." There, the petitioners alleged that the
Commission, while in the process of conducting an environmental re-
view, authorized the operation of a nuclear plant at a level which
would cause a significant, adverse impact on the quality of the envi-
ronment." In finding against the Commission," the court unequivocally
affirmed the policy of NEPA:
The requirement that all federal agencies prepare . . . [a]
detailed statement prior to the taking of action which may
have a significant impact on the environment is . . . manda-
tory . . . and must be performed in all circumstances prior
to the taking of [such] agency action."
It is hoped that the court's reiteration of NEPA's mandate has closed
this potentially dangerous "loophole" in the new regulations. In a
broader sense, as a result of this decision, the regulations may now
be viewed as having moved closer to guaranteeing full Commission
compliance with the provisions of the Act.
While the new procedures in general and the stated shift in the
Commission's policy both seemed to provide encouragement for a bet-
ter regulatory control of the dangers connected with nuclear energy
production, a cloud from the blast at Amchitka Island has, at least for
the moment, obscured the true course of these changes. Whether the
cloud will permanently obstruct NEPA's effectiveness is not yet cer-
tain. Although a review of the judicial proceedings which preceded
the Amchitka nuclear test is unlikely to alleviate this uncertainty, such
an analysis does indicate the type of challenges which NEPA may have
to endure in future litigation.
25
 Id.
20 Id.
27 337 F. Supp. 287, Civil Nos. 2207 and 2208, 3 E.R.C. 1453 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1971).
28
 The plant in this case would operate at nearly 50% of its capacity. Id. at 294.
29
 The court found that there was a substantial showing of noncompliance with
NEPA and therefore enjoined the Commission from issuing an operating permit.
ao 3 E.R.C. at 1455.
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II. THE AMCHITKA LITIGATION
In early 1971, the Nixon Administration, in conjunction with its
proposed Safeguard missile system, obtained congressional authoriza-
tion for the underground detonation of a nuclear device on Amchitka
Island, Alaska 8'
 The responsibility for conducting the test fell to
the AEC and, in connection with its responsibilities, the Commission
drafted an impact statement. Shortly after the details of the proposed
test were made public, numerous environmental protection groups 32
as well as the Canadian government" began a series of efforts aimed
at preventing the test. Of these, the one which attracted the most pub-
lic attention—and the one which deserves our consideration for its
probable effect on NEPA—consisted of a series of suits petitioning
federal courts to enjoin the blast!' The complaints in this series of
cases focused on the narrow issue of the inadequacy of the AEC's
impact statement. The petitioners alleged that the impact statement
did not contain relevant data and reports from members of other fed-
eral agencies." This information, it was alleged, recommended against
the Amchitka test "specifically because of [its] potential harm to the
environment."
As with the AEC hearing procedure questioned in Calvert Cliffs',
the adequacy of the environmental impact statement required by
81
 The congressional approval came in the form of appropriations for the blast. Con-
gress, however, barred the test before mid-1972 unless the President authorized it. The
President gave his authorization for the blast on October 27, 1971. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1971, at 1, col. 5.
32 See id.
33
 Id. The Canadian government applied diplomatic pressure on the Secretary of
State to cancel the test.
$4 The New York Times reported that seven environmental organizations filed legal
action to stop the blast. Id. For purposes of this comment, the analysis will focus on the
series of appeals waged in the suit brought by the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc.
88 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, — F.2d —, Civil No. 71-
1732 at 2-3 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1971).
In the Appendix to his dissenting opinion in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917, 92 S. Ct. 242 (1971), Justice Douglas set forth the data
and reports which the Commission had failed to include in its impact statement. The re-
ports in question included those from:
(a) Russell Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality;
(b) Edward E. David, Jr., Director of the Office of Science and Technology;
(c) William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency;
and
(d) Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
404 U.S. at 920, 92 S. Ct. at 244.
As note 45 infra indicates, these reports did contain information which questioned
the safety of the blast.
36 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,	 F.2d	 Civil No. 71-
1732 at 8-9 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 5, 1971).
711
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
NEPA compelled the courts in these cases to make a highly sensitive
determination. An adverse determination regarding the breadth of
NEPA's mandate could undermine the purpose of the Act and curb
its effectiveness. The well-recognized purpose of the impact statement,
in addition to its presentation of alternative courses of action, is to
guarantee disclosure of all the possible effects the proposed action may
have on the environment." A corollary purpose, inherent in the pro-
visions of the requirement, is to alert both the agency and the public
to any potential dangers, so that appropriate preventative 88 or reme-
dial" action may be taken by the agency." Consequently, administra-
tive or judicial justification for excluding relevant information or
expert opinions from the impact statement must, in most cases,' curb
the Act's effectiveness in fostering adequate disclosure. In all of the
decisions" concerned with the AEC's compliance with NEPA, the re-
spondent-Commission argued that certain environmental reports need
not be included in the impact statement, and that the petitioner should
not have access to them through discovery proceedings. The basis for
their exclusion, it was contended, was legitimately grounded in the
agency's discretion under the Act, for reasons of national defense and
security, and the executive privilege.
A. The Lower Court Decisions
In the first of these cases," the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was asked to review the granting of a motion
for summary judgment in favor of the respondent Commission. Here,
the petitioner, the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, had sought
to use discovery proceedings in order to examine reports which the
AEC had refused to include in its impact statement." The petitioner con-
87 449 F2d at 1114.
88 Id.
89 Id.
40
 Id. This action may be either voluntary or involuntary, if compelled by court
order.
41 An exception, of course, would be where an irresponsible opinion is excluded—its
exclusion would not curb the breadth of disclosure made in the impact statement. One of
the courts which reviewed the Amchitka petition rather summarily made this point. See
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, — F.2d —, Civil No. 71-1732 at
7-8 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 5, 1971). The court, however, did not indicate what the test of an
"irresponsible opinion" should be. Id.
48 Several appeals were taken from Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg. The relevant decision will be fully cited to each separate case when specifically
discussed in the text.
48 For a list of these reports see note 35 supra. See also note 45 infra.
44 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, — F.2d —, Civil No. 71-
1732 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 5, 1971).
46 See note 35 supra. Among the reports, the memorandum opinion of Russell Train,
Chairman of the Council of Environmental Quality, indicated that the likelihood of an
earthquake resulting from the blast could not be totally dismissed. See 92 S. CL at 24647.
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tended that the Commission's failure to include these reports violated
NEPA's provisions. While carefully noting the Commission's discre-
tion to include only responsible opinions in its impact statement, the
court also emphasized that the AEC impact statement procedure should
comply in "good faith" with the requirements of the Act." The em-
phasis of the court on the "good faith" of AEC compliance with
NEPA's provisions seemed both to echo the mandate of Calvert Cliffs'
and to reaffirm the validity of the holding in that case. In the closing
sentence of the opinion, however, an ominous note was sounded: the
right of the petitioner to continue his discovery on remand, the court
indicated, was "subject of course to the possible interposition of valid
claims of privilege."7
As expected, the Commission did raise the "executive privilege"
argument to exclude certain reports and data from the petitioner's dis-
covery procedures.' The Commission not only interposed the privilege,
but also argued in both the district and circuit courts that the privilege
was absolute. In effect, the Commission asserted that it could invoke
this privilege without having to consider the benefit to the public in
providing access to the privileged information." On appeal, the circuit
court tersely rejected the Commission's contention: " [i]n our view,
this claim of absolute immunity for documents in possession of an
executive department or agency, upon the bold assertion of its head,
is not sound law." 6 °
Although the court found the privilege to be limited, this limita-
tion will likely not lessen significantly its detrimental impact on
46
 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,	 F.2d —, Civil No. 71-
1732 at 8 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 5, 1971).
47 Id. at 9.
46
 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, — F.2d —, Civil No. 71-
1854 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 28, 1971).
40 Wigmore provides the classic definition of privileged communications in his treatise
on Evidence. The privilege may be recognized in judicial proceedings, he asserts, when the
four following conditions are met:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be dis-
closed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained from correct disposal of the litigation.
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Of these conditions, the
fourth is obviously the one which attempts to balance the injury to the relations between
members of the Executive branch and the benefit to the public in having the information
disclosed. The government's argument thus focused on the absolute privilege of executive
officials to communicate with each other without the possibility of compelled disclosure
of their communications during judicial proceedings.
Do Committee for. Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, — F.2d
	 Civil No. 71-
1854 at 7 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 28, 1971).
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NEPA's effectiveness. This conclusion logically results from an anal-
ysis of the investigation which a court must undertake in order to
determine whether the privilege should be available. Normally, in
making this determination, the court must balance the benefits of put-
ting the information into the hands of the public against the detriment
to the party who raises the privilege—in this case the Executive,'
In most instances, the Executive, including administrative agencies,
can proffer a strong argument, based on national defense needs, for
recognizing the privilege. The area of nuclear energy, in particular,
provides an obvious context in which this argument may be raised.
Furthermore, this context is not limited solely to nuclear activity di-
rectly related to the production of armaments for national defense,
as was the blast at Amchitka Island. Quite conceivably, the govern-
ment could argue that huge nuclear power plants are of vital im-
portance in maintaining a minimum level of domestic security and
prosperity because of the power they produce. Their role, it could
be argued, is so essential to these goals that extensive disclosures of
nuclear plant operating procedures or construction plans could render
them vulnerable to sabotage. Any court burdened with the responsi-
bility of assessing these contentions would likely be inclined to sustain
the privilege in order to insure against possible danger to the national
electric power system.
When viewed in terms of NEPA's disclosure requirements in the
impact statement, these possible uses of the executive privilege, even
though limited, portend an uncertain future for the Act. These possi-
bilities suggest that the executive privilege must be construed nar-
rowly if the Act is to be rescued from impotence. A solution which
would adequately preserve the salutary effect of NEPA's provisions
and, at the same time, assure national security will have to separate
the material contained in the "security" document into "discoverable"
environmental and "classified" defense categories. Although some ma-
terial, as a result of natural overlap, will not be easily classified along
these lines, the courts in such circumstances must assume the respon-
sibility of scrutinizing the "top secret" label in order to make certain
that it is justified.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
To some degree the Supreme Court was confronted with this re-
sponsibility in the Amchitka case, The Committee for Nuclear Respon-
sibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger." Although the narrow issue presented to
51 See condition (4) in supra note 49. The relation of which that condition speaks
consists of the relations between various members of the Executive.
62 404 U.S. 917, 92 S. Ct. 242 (1971).
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the Court in a special Saturday session was whether the Court should
enjoin the blast pending completion of the petitioner's discovery pro-
ceedings, the Court's decision to deny the injunction ominously indi-
cates the Court's unwillingness to assume this responsibility.
During oral argument on behalf of the Commission, Mr. Justice
Brennan specifically asked the Solicitor General the question: "as-
suming that the environmental impact statement was deficient, and
assuming therefore the !blast was illegal, do you still take the position
that the Court should allow the blast to take place and deny the
injunction?"" The Solicitor General answered affirmatively, on the
grounds that Congress had allocated 200 million dollars for the blast
and that the President had approved of the nuclear test. At another
point in his argument, the Solicitor General responded to a question
concerning the financial cost of delaying the test by replying that the
costs would be increased geometrically for every day of delay.
The denial of the request for the injunction by the narrow margin
of a 4-3 vote seemingly indicates that the Court weighed other factors
besides the blast's violation of NEPA. The Court undoubtedly had
to consider the narrow issue of whether to grant equitable relief in
the form of an injunction restraining the test. It is quite conceivable
that in regard to this issue the Court did observe the requirements
of NEPA and at the same time adopted the reasoning of the circuit
court of appeals in this same case." The circuit court had concluded
that "[w]hile we deny preventive relief, it should be clear that plain-
tiffs may yet prevail in their claim that the AEC failed to comply with
NEPA in approving the [Amchitka] test."" Although the case pre-
sented "a substantial question as to the legality of the proposed test
. . . [the court reasoned that] it [did] not necessarily follow that the
plaintiffs [were] entitled to an injunction against the test."H Specifi-
cally, then, the court of appeals decision recognized that an injunction
would be issued only where there was a showing that irreparable harm
would otherwise result. Because of the "meager state of the record"
before it, the court felt constrained to refuse an injunction;" it is not
unlikely that the Supreme Court may have felt similarly constrained.
Beyond the narrow question of equitable relief, a more fundamen-
tal issue may have concerned the Supreme Court in the Amchitka case
—namely, the possible collision between the three branches of Amer-
53 My account of the oral argument in this case is based on my own perceptions and
on notes I made while sitting in the gallery during the special session.
54 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, — F.2d —, Civil No. 71-
]869 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 3, 1970.
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id. at 3.
5? Id. at 5.
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ican Government: the staging of the blast at Amchitka was not solely
an AEC decision; the President had expressly approved it and the
Congress bad appropriated the funds for its execution.' The unequi-
vocal approval of the test by both the Executive and Legislative
branches may well have affected the Court's decision. Thus, in the
majority's view, the Court's intervention at this considerably late
stage in the test preparations might well have been criticized by the
other branches as an over-reaching by the judiciary neither necessary
nor desirable in light of the circumstances surrounding the blast.
It is also conceivable that the Court balanced the benefits of dis-
closing the information contained in the "top secret" documents with
the detriment—in financial cost and the weakening of national secu-
rity—to the Executive if disclosure were to be made. Since there was
no written majority opinion in this case," the view that the Court
effected a careful balancing of interests in regard to executive privilege
is, of course, somewhat conjectural. If not explicitly, the decision at
least indirectly contravenes the holding and spirit of Calvert Cliffs' that
"if the [AEC] decision [under NEPA] was reached procedurally
without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental
factors—conducted fully and in good faith—it is the responsibility
of the courts to reverse!'" Mr. Justice Douglas, in a written dissent,
quoted this portion of the Calvert Clif s' opinion; $' conceivably and
unfortunately, his reiteration may indicate that the Court did in fact
consider the impact of NEPA but nonetheless found that its reach
did not extend to the reports and documents cloaked behind the exec-
utive privilege.
CONCLUSION
A review of the litigation relating to the Amchitka blast leads to
one clear conclusion: these decisions have not given the procedural
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act the broad appli-
cation which the Calvert Cliffs' court recognized as necessary and
proper. Whether this conclusion reflects the manner in which the Act
will be construed in future cases is speculative at present. It is possi-
ble, however, that the Act's environmental policy may be disregarded,
as apparently it was in the Supreme Court decision, whenever the gov-
ernment can persuasively argue that national defense and security
would be threatened.
Continued governmental reliance on this argument, and on the
executive privilege, in order to avoid compliance with NEPA's provi-
58 See discussion in note 3 supra.
59 Mr. Justice Douglas submitted his dissent in writing.
59 449 F.2d at 1115.
81 404 U.S. at 918, 92 S. Ct. at 243.
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sions also seems likely. In matters of national defense, it could be
argued that public disclosure of certain information regarding nuclear
activity could prove damaging; this argument undoubtedly will be
relied on in those cases. Unquestionably, use of nuclear power for do-
mestic purposes will increase, particularly in the electric power indus-
try. As the demand for power grows, a concomitant demand for the
construction of nuclear power plants may well cause the Commission
to be less exacting in investigating their environmental impacts. If the
public is denied access to environmental information by federal agen-
cies, and if the assertion of the executive privilege prevents disclosure
by judicial order, then the dangers of thermal pollution will likely grow
unabated. At this juncture, for purposes of needed clarification, an-
other case is necessary; one which, unlike the Amchitka litigation,
will squarely present to the Supreme Court the question of the reach
of NEPA's provisions. Only a reaffirmation of the principles of Calvert
Cliffs' by the Court will restore to the Act the degree of effectiveness
it was once believed to possess.
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